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NOTE
In Re Extradition of Atta: Tension
Between the Political Offense Exception
and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy
Introduction
Since 1980, more than 5,000 terrorist acts1 have occurred
which have resulted in 3,800 deaths and over 10,000 people
wounded. Of these casualties, 363 of the dead and 518 of the
wounded were American.'
The increase in terrorist activities during the Reagan Ad-
ministration has produced a tougher United States position
through the adoption of a hard-line policy3 regarding terrorism
and the means of dealing with it." This position was demon-
strated by the United States responses during the Achille Lauro
There is no universal acceptance of a definition for terrorism or terrorist acts, this
is partly due to disagreement as to the desirability and necessity of defining the term. J.
MURPHY, PUNISHING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR POLICY INI-
TIATIVES 3 (1985); Bell, Terror: An Overview, in INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN THE CON-
TEMPORARY WORLD 36-43 (Livingston 1978).
2 Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, GIST International Terrorism
(May 1988).
3 Vice President's Task Force, Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force On
Combatting Terrorism ii (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter Public Report]: "The Justice Depart-
ment should pursue legislation making anyone found guilty of murdering a hostage
under any circumstances subject to the death penalty." Id. at 25.
Despite the lack of a universally accepted definition of terrorism, the United
States has attempted to define its use of the word. "Our government believes that terror-
ist acts have certain characteristics. They are premeditated and politically motivated.
They are conducted against noncombatant targets and usually have as their goal trying
to intimidate or influence a government's policy." And also, they "are criminal acts". L.
Bremer III, Terrorism and the Rule of Law (U.S. State Dept., Pub. Aff. Bureau, Current
Policy No. 947 (1987).
W . Farrell, The U.S. Government Response To Terrorism, 90 (1982). Miller, Ter-
rorism and Hostage Taking: Lessons from the Iranian Crisis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 515
n.8 (1982), See also Public Report supra note 3; L. Bremer III, Counterterrorism: Strat-
egy and Tactics (U.S. State Dept., Pub. Aff. Bureau, Current Policy No. 1027, 1987).
1
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affair 6 and the military raid on Libya.7 Congress also acted
through the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism8 , which
focused on the need to have international cooperation in extra-
diting terrorists." Further, in 1985, the United States Senate rat-
ified the United States - United Kingdom Supplementary
Treaty,10 which has restricted the political offense exception to
extradition."
Currently, the United States government has a three-part
policy to counter terrorist activity. 2 First, it is the policy of the
government that no concessions shall be made to terrorists. Sec-
ond, the United States engages political, economic and diplo-
matic pressure on those States which sponsor terrorism. And
third, the government has adopted a program designed to bring
terrorists to justice. With international cooperation, the govern-
ment seeks to identify, track, arrest and punish alleged ter-
rorists. "Bringing terrorists to justice - punishing them - is the
final step in the process of fighting terrorists. Merely thwarting
them is not enough, for if the guilty can know no fear, then the
innocent can know no rest."'"
This program has recently met with some success. In 1986,
terrorism reportedly dropped six percent and another ten per-
' See generally N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1985, at A12, col 5; id, Oct 14, 1985 at A12 col
3, Time, Oct 21, 1985 at 22 col. 1-3.
See Church, Hitting The Source, Time, Apr. 26, 1986 at 16-27, Doerner, In the
Dead of Night, Time, Apr. 26, 1986 at 28-31, Church, Forgetting Gadaffi, Time, Apr. 21,
1986, at 18-27.
1 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism, Pub. L. No. 98-533, 98 Stat. 2706
[codified in same sections of 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 41 U.S.C. (1984)].
9 Id. §201 Under "International Cooperation" section.
" Supplementary Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, signed in Washington D.C. on
June 25, 1985 and formally transmitted to Senate of July 17, 1985, S. Doc. No. 8, 99th
Cong. 1st Sess. (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104 (1985)[hereinafter U.S.- U.K. Supple-
mentary Treaty]. Later revisions of the Supplementary Treaty were prepared by the
Senate Foreign Relations committee and ratified in the Senate by resolution on July 17,
1986, S. Doc. No. 8, 99th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1986).
" Id. Article I.
" L. Bremer III, Terrorism: Myths and Reality (U.S. State Dept., Pub. Aff. Bureau,
Current Policy No. 1047, 1988). See also, L. Bremer III, Terrorism and The Rule of Law
(U.S. Department of State, Pub. Aff. Bureau, Current Policy No. 947, 1987).
IS L. Bremer III, Practical Measures For Dealing With Terrorism (U.S. State Dept.,
Pub. Aff. Bureau, Current Policy No. 913, 1987).
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cent in 1987.1" In West Germany, Hamadei, a Lebanese terrorist
awaits trial, charged with air hijacking and murder stemming
from the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847.15 In France, Georges
Ibrahim Abjallah was sentenced to life imprisonment for his in-
volvement in the murders of a U.S. military attache and an Is-
raeli diplomat.1 6 In Washington, D.C., Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese
terrorist awaits trial, charged with hostage taking arising from
the 1985 highjacking of Jordanian Airlines Flight 401.17 The
F.B.I. arrested Yunis after luring him into international wa-
ters.18 In New York, Mohmoud Abed Atta, an Fatah Abu Nidal
terrorist, has been incarcerated awaiting possible extradition to
Israel to face criminal charges arising from an attack on a bus on
the West Bank of the Occupied Territories.
The United States government, however, has encountered
difficulty in the prosecution of Mohmoud Abed Atta. Unable to
assert its own extra-territorial jurisdiction, the United States has
not complied with the Israeli request for Atta's extradition be-
cause it has not yet obtained judicial certification. Although the
State Department favors extradition, the extradition has not
been certified by a United States magistrate. Magistrate Caden
in In Re Atta19 denied certification, finding Atta non-extradita-
ble due primarily to the political offense exception to the extra-
dition treaty between the U.S. and Israel.
Part I of the note includes background information on the
political offense exception and current trends of interpretation
by other courts. This part also includes a brief discussion of the
U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty, the Eain and Quinn decisions,
and the neutrality doctrine. Part II presents the facts and a
summary of the Atta decision, including the Court's application
of the political offense exception, an analysis of the incidence
test, and a discussion of the Court's jurisdiction. Part III con-
" L. Bremer III, Counterterrorism: U.S. Policy And Proposed Legislation (U.S.
State Dept., Pub. Aff. Bureau, Current Policy No. 1019, 1987).
'B N.Y. Times, June 15, 1985, at il, col. 6.
L. Bremer III, Counterterrorism: Strategy And Tactics (U.S. State Dept., Pub.
Aff. Bureau, Current Policy No. 1073, 1987).
17 United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.D.C. 1988)(The court ruled that it
had jurisdiction over the defendant).
" See id. at 912.
"9 In Re Extradition of Atta, No. 87-M-0551 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988)(WESTLAW
66866)(Caden, J.).
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cludes that despite United States policy objectives, the political
offense exception has still be applied by the courts, raising the
issue of a resulting supplementation to the U.S.-Israeli extradi-
tion treaty.
Part I: The Political Offense Exception - Background
A. The Exception
The political offense exception is incorporated in most ex-
tradition treaties. 0 Its history lies in the American and French
revolutions and their subsequent Constitutions," and it was first
seen in the Franco-Belgian Treaty of 1834.22 The political of-
fense exception is the recognition of a continual right of a people
to manifest their disatisfaction with a ruling government and
their right to political change.2 3 The political offense exception
protects the right of persons to rebel against any government
they find unsatisfactory24 or oppressive, 25 even by armed resis-
tance under certain circumstances, 2 by eliminating the threat of
extradition. The term political offense has rarely been defined in
extradition treaties.2 7 Judicial interpretation has been the pri-
mary source of its definition, 8 allowing wider flexibility in its
20 S.P. SINHA: ASYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 173 (1971).
21 Decleration des droits de l'homme et du Citoyen du 26 Aout 1789, art. 2 (Fr.),
incorporated as La preamble de la Constitution de 1791 (Fr.), reprinted in LES CONSTI-
TUTIONS DE LA FRANCE DEPUIS 1789, 33 (S. Godechat ed. 1970); Declaration of Indepen-
dence para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
22 22 B.F.S.P. 223.
23 Lafferty, The Turning Point Approaches: The Political Offense Exception to Ex-
tradition, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 549, 565 (1987). But see Note, Combatting International
Terrorism: Limiting the Political Offense Exception Doctrine in Order to Prevent "One
Man's Terrorism" from becoming Another Man's Heroism, 3 VILL. L. REV. 1495, 1537
(1986).
24 Lafferty, supra note 23, at 565.
2" The Declaration of Independence provides:
Whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of [the people's inaliable
rights], it is the Right of the People to alter or abolish it, and to institute new
government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in
such forum, as to them seen most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
The Declaration of Independence para.1 (U.S. 1776).
26 Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the
United States and The United Kingdom. A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation
Among Allies and Sound Law and Policy, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255 (1987).
27 S.P. SINHA, supra, note 20 at 173.
2" M. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 371 (1974).
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application29 based upon the circumstances and facts of each
case.
3 0
There are two categories of political offenses which are rec-
ognized; pure political offenses and relative political offenses.31
Pure political offenses are acts which are directed toward a rul-
ing government affecting public interest and not having any ele-
ments of a common crime.32 Since pure political offenses are
targeted at the rights of the government and don't effect the in-
dividual rights of private citizens,33 courts usually conclude them
to be non-extraditable offenses.3 4 Thus, application of the politi-
cal offense exception becomes unnecessary. Relative political of-
fenses reach private interests3" and are considered private
wrongs or common crimes committed in furtherance of a politi-
cal objective.3 6 In order for an act to be a relative political of-
fense it is required that there exist a nexus between the crime
committed and the political act or motive.37 It is these types of
offenses that are often found extraditable requiring a court to
determine whether to apply the exception.
Although several approaches to defining the political offense
exception have been developed by courts throughout the world, 8
American courts have adopted the "incidence" test. 9 The inci-
dence test was first introduced in In re Castioni,"° where the
court said that "fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for
extradition crimes if those crimes were incidental to and form
2 In re Mackin, 80 Cr.Misc. 1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), appeal dismissed, 668 F.2d
122 (2d Cir., 1981).
"0 M. BASSlOUNI, supra note 28 at 26.
" Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 203 (9th Cir., 1957), vacated 355 U.S. 393
(1958)(mem.).
2 M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 28, at 383.
" Id. at 383.
" Recent Decisions, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: A 19th Cent.
British Standard in 20th Cent. American Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1005, 1009
(1984); Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 794 (9th Cir., 1986), cert. denied, 107 Sup. Ct.
271 (1986).
" M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 28 at 383.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 794, n.34. The two major approaches used were the French
"objective" test and the Swiss "proportionality" or "predominance" test.
" Id. at 795, n.4.
40 [1891] 1 Q.B. 149 (1890).
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part of a political disturbance."' 1 The incidence test was subse-
quently adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Ornelas
v. Ruiz,"' which is the only time the Court has ever reviewed the
political offense exception, and has since been applied.'" The in-
cidence test is a two pronged test. First, the court must find the
existence of a political uprising or disturbance. Second, the act
committed must be incidental to or in furtherance of a political
objective"", i.e., a nexus must exist between the act and the
uprising.' 5
Some courts have required additional elements be satisfied
before finding the exception applicable. This seems to be the re-
sult of some courts' difficulty in reconciling the exception and
terrorism. 6 Some require that the defendant be a national of the
State where the uprising has occurred. Others have focused on
whether the defendant was a member of a group, and the objec-
tives of that group.' 7 The court in Quinn v. Robinson apparently
added an additional requirement that the act occur in the terri-
tory where the political change is sought, rather than mere terri-
torial proximity.' 8
In the latest challenge to the validity and application of the
political offense exception, In re Atta" has brought the excep-
tion back to life following a period of criticism and controversy
over its existence and application." In re Atta reapplies the po-
litical offense exception in view of U.S. ideological political val-
Id. at 152.
42 Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1896).
3 Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir., 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981),
Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (1986), In re Machin, 80 Cr. Misc. 1 (1981), Matter of
Doherty, 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d
1189 (5th Cir., 1971).
" Quinn, 783 F.2d at 809.
45 Id. at 809.
11 Id. at 801-03.
41 Matter of Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 275. In Re McMullen, Magis.No. 3-78-1099
MG (N.D. Cal., filed May 11, 1979).
40 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 808.
41 In re Extradition of Atta, No. 87-M-0551 (E.D.N.Y. June 17, 1988)(WESTLAW
66866)(Caden, J.).
" Baunach, The U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty: Justice for Terrorists or Terror
for Justice?, 2 CONN. J. INT'L L. 463, 465 (1987); Note, Political Legitimacy in the Law of
Political Asylum, 99 HARV. L. REv. 450, 452-53 (1985). But see Note, Extradition in an
Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 654, 657 (1986).
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ues51 and also international relations, where the goal of the judi-
ciary should be neutrality in determining the legitimacy of
particular political objectives.52 The means by which these polit-
ical objectives are achieved, often through armed struggle, may
seem barbaric to some yet are viewed acceptable and valid to
others.53 The doctrine of neutrality saves the court from making
this distinction.
In Atta, Magistrate Caden applied the incidence test and
upheld the use of the political offense exception to deny the Is-
raeli request for extradition.54 The Magistrate stated that the
political offense exception protects "the rights of those, whose
philosophy may differ from ours, to fight for a way of life they
believe in," 55 and political change even if accomplished by less
than desirable means.56 The court recognized the importance of
neutrality in arriving at its decision.57 In doing so, the court con-
cluded that its only objectives were to determine whether or not
there was a political uprising and whether the acts of the de-
fendant were incidental to the conflict or in furtherance of the
political objective.58 After reviewing both historical and testimo-
nial evidence of the situation on the West Bank, which is where
the act had taken place, Magistrate Caden concluded that there
was an uprising and that the act committed by the defendant
" U.S. Declaration of Independence, supra note 25. The ideas are embodied in the
American Revolution, and from George Washington who was the father of modern gue-
rilla tactics, in attacking, ambushing and sabotaging superior British forces. See J. BOND,
THE RULES OF RIOT; INTERNAL CONFLIcT AND THE LAW OF WAR 45-48 (1974); see gener-
ally M. SMELSER, THE WINNING OF INDEPENDENCE (1972).
" Quinn, 783 F.2d at 804.
13 The Court stated:
It is not our place to impose our notion of civilized strife on people who are seek-
ing to overthrow the regimes in control of these countries in contests and circum-
stances that we have not experienced, and with which we can identify only with
the greatest difficulty. It is the fact that these insurgents are seeking to change
their governments that makes the political offense exception applicable, not their
reason for wishing to do so or the nature of the acts by which they hope to accom-
plish that goal.
Id. at 804.
In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 36)(Caden, J.).
's Id. at 36.
Id. at 39.
7 Id. at 40.
Id. at 40.
1989]
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had been in furtherance of or incident to that uprising."
B. The Quinn & Eain Cases
Recent decisions addressing the political offense exception
are Eain v. Wilkes6" and Quinn v. Robinson.6 1 In Quinn, Great
Britain sought the extradition of the defendant, Quinn, from the
United States in order to face charges of conspiracy and murder.
These charges stemmed from a Provincial Irish Republican
Army letter bombing campaign and the murder of a British po-
lice constable.6 2 The court in Quinn restricted the uprising com-
ponent of the incidence test. Those persons, it concluded, who
were not citizens of the country or territory where the uprising
occurred were to be excluded form the protection of the political
offense exception. Furthermore, it was determined that the of-
fense must have occurred within the territory where the change
in government was sought.
Magistrate Caden in the Atta case rejected this part of the
incidence test analysis,6 3 pointing out that since Ahmad's act oc-
curred on the West Bank, the territorial proximity requirement
could be liberally satisfied." As to the citizenship requirement
established by Quinn, Magistrate Caden did not interpret this to
be a strict requirement, rather a flexible one that could be met
in view of the defendant's ties to the West Bank . 5 Quinn also
held that only a liberal nexus between the act and the uprising
needs to be shown.6 6 Similarly, all the circumstances surround-
ing the defendant's acts were deemed necessary for review by
Magistrate Caden in order to review the liberal standard. 7
Eain v. Wilkes" involved a request for extradition by Israel
of a defendant who was accused of setting a bomb in an Israeli
I, d. at 50.
60 641 F.2d at 504.
61 783 F.2d at 776.
62 Id. at 783-85.
63 The Quinn court had noted that under certain circumstances territorial proximity
could satisfy the test. Id. 783 F.2d at 807.
In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 16)(Caden, J.).
"' Id. at 19.
Quinn, 783 F.2d at 809.
67 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 34) (Caden, J.).
66 Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 504.
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city's market area that killed two young boys and injured thirty
others. 9 The United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit,
excluded this bombing from the definition of a political act and
thereby, rendering the political offense exception inapplicable to
it. The court identified the political disturbance requirement as
involving organized forms of violence aimed at the disruption of
a political system 3 As such, the court held that "Ithe indis-
criminate bombing of a civilian population is not recognized as a
protected political act. '71 This notion was further reiterated in
Quinn, which held crimes against humanity to be excluded from
coverage of the political offense exception.7 2 International terror-
ism, the court said, did not merit the incidence test.7 The Mag-
istrate in the Atta case accepted this philosophy, yet, he did not
see the passengers on the bus as mere civilians or settlers.7' The
Magistrate pointed out that although the settlers on the West
Bank might not be deemed military in the traditional sense,
they displayed many of the characteristics of military person-
nel.7 Many of them are reserve members of the Israeli Army
and are frequently called into active duty in the area of their
settlements.76 Living in a violent area where combat with the
P.L.O. and the Palestinians is a common occurrence, the Israeli
Army provides training and weapons to the inhabitants of the
Occupied Territories, as well as cooperation on a regular basis.
In view of this, Magistrate Caden concluded that the settlers
were not common civilians.77 "While the settlers may not fit the
description of military personnel as it is commonly thought of, it
is clear that at a minimum they are willing participants in a civil
war or a violent community conflict designed to acquire a long
sought after homeland. 78
The Court in Eain declined to recognize how the offenses
involved, committed by a member of the P.L.O., could be con-
69 Id. at 509-10.
70 Id. at 219.
7' Id. at 521.
Quinn, 783 F.2d at 801.
73 Id. at 817.
71 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 36-37)(Caden, J.).
75 Id. at 36.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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sidered part of a political conflict. It stated that a political con-
flict traditionally involves "ongoing organized battles between
contending armies, a situation which, given the dispersed nature
of the P.L.O., may be distinguished. ' 79 Conversely, terrorist ac-
tivity is sporadic and somewhat arbitrary in nature and "seeks
to promote social chaos."'80 Overshadowing the Court's argument
that P.L.O. or terrorist activity does not fit within the definition
of political conflict was their concern with the consequence of
giving the political offense exception liberal application. If ter-
rorist activity were deemed to be part of a political conflict noth-
ing would prevent an influx of terrorists seeking a safe haven in
the United States via the political offense exception. Although
the Court recognized the "validity and usefulness of the political
offense exception," it warned that, "it should be applied with
great care lest our country become a social jungle and encour-
agement to terrorists everywhere." 81 Despite the Eain Court's
concerns, Magistrate Caden in the Atta case found the situation
on the West Bank of the Occupied Territories to be a political
uprising," satisfying the first prong of the incidence test.
C. The Neutrality Concept
Magistrate Caden's discussion of the political offense excep-
tion also concentrated on the purpose and policy of protecting
the court of the requested State from having to take a seemingly
political position in favor of one side of the conflict.8 3 The Court
in Atta enjoyed the protection offered by the exception.' Courts
will not inquire into the judicial system of the requesting State
as to whether the person may receive unfair or unbiased treat-
ment. This non-inquiry rule removes political judgement from
the judiciary, allowing the court to focus on the legal issues.85
" Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 519; see also, Ramos v. Diaz, 129 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.
Fla. 1958)(members of an organized revolutionary army with established chain of com-
mand operating within the country).
8 Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 519.
Id. at 520.
82 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 33)(Caden, J.).
83 Id at 38; Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 266.
11 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 40)(Caden, J.).
81 Lafferty, supra note 23, at 556; see also Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 626 (7th
Cir., 1932); Sindona v. Grant, 461 F.Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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Further, the Quinn Court pointed out that a court should
merely apply the incidence test to the offense and not determine
what action would increase the chances of obtaining the sought
after political objective." Quinn noted that judgments regarding
foreign governments are political questions outside the judicial
role.87 The Court in Atta followed this reasoning. "Today's
rebels in the West Bank may be tomorrow's rulers there, and it
is not this court's objective or purpose to impair future foreign
relations by prejudging the legitimacy of the Palestinian objec-
tives."'8 The Court did not pass judgment on the activities of
the Israelis or the Palestinians, for that was what the neutrality
protection of the political offense exception afforded.89 The
court's function was to apply the law as it existed. Was there an
uprising and, if so, was the act incidental to it, or committed in
furtherance of its objectives?9"
D. The United States-United Kingdom Supplementary
Treaty
Discussion of the political offense exception would not be
complete without a brief summary of the United States-United
Kingdom Supplementary Treaty.e' Most recently, the United
States government has sought to restrict the political offense ex-
ception from its extradition treaty with Great Britain.2 The
Supplementary Extradition Treaty has been seen as an attempt
to avoid what the United States government views to be unfa-
vorable judicial decisions.'3 Then Secretary of State, George
Shultz, described the treaty as representing ". . . a significant
step to improve law enforcement cooperation and counter the
threat of international terrorism and other crimes of violence."' 4
88 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 804.
17 Id. at 804.
88 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 40)(Caden, J.).
"s Id. at 40.
11 Id. at 40.
" U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 10.
82 Note, Expediting Extradition: The United States-United Kingdom Supplemen-
tal Treaty of 1986, LOYOLA L.A. INT'L & Couw. L.J. 135 (1988).
" Lafferty, supra note 23, at 562.
8" U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 10, reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1104
(1985)(letter from Secretary of State George Shultz accompanying the treaty).
1989]
11
PACE YB. INT'L L.
Moreover, the treaty has been viewed as assisting the British
government in its conflict with I.R.A. terrorists.9 5 Prior to the
treaty, several I.R.A. members were denied extradition to Great
Britain by U.S. courts96 through the application of the political
offense exception.
In application, the Supplementary Treaty eliminates the
political offense exception as a viable exception to extradition.
9 7
The term political offense has rarely been defined by extradition
treaties. 8 Yet, this Treaty lists those acts which are not to be
considered political, and thus, does away with the political of-
fense through exclusion. Article 1 of the Treaty lists the crimes
that cannot be considered offenses of a political character. These
include: aircraft hijacking and sabotage, crimes against interna-
tionally protected persons (such as diplomats), hostage taking,
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, unlawful detention, and of-
fenses relating to explosives, firearms, and serious property dam-
age. 9 With Article 1, the first prong of the incidence test cannot
be met since these acts are statutorily non-political. The result is
confusion as to what is left of the political offense exception
under this Treaty.
Article 4 of the Treaty retroacts the provisions with respect
to offenses committed before the Treaty had taken effect.100
This may create constitutional problems as it affects the extradi-
tion of individuals whom U.S. courts refused to extradite
previously.101
By eliminating the political offense exception throughout
Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty, the United States gov-
ernment has taken the determination of what constitutes a po-
" Lafferty, supra note 23, at 572.
" Note, supra note 92, at 142; cases where Great Britain was denied extradition of
Irish nationalists include: United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491 (2d Cir., 1986); Quinn
v. Robinson, 783 F.2d at 776; In re Mackin, 668 F.2d at 122; In re McMullen, Magistrate
No. 3-70-1099 MG (memorandum decision) (N.D. Cal. 1979).
9 Lafferty, supra, note 23 at 564.
" S.P. SINHA: AsYLUM AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 173 (1971).
9 U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 10, at 1105-07.
10 U.S.-U.K. Supplementary Treaty, supra note 10, art. 4 at 1107-08 ("This Supple-
mentary Treaty shall apply to any offense committed before or after the Supplementary
Treaty enters into force").
00' Lafferty, supra note 23, at 563 & n. 90 (possible violation of the prohibition
against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder).
[Vol. 1:163
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litical act out of the hands of the judiciary.10 2 This Treaty repre-
sents a break in the historical neutrality 03 of the U.S. in not
assisting another State in suppressing its internal political
dissent.104
Part II: In the Matter of the Extradition of Mahmoud Abed
Atta
A. The Facts
The defendant, Mahmoud Abed Atta, a/k/a Mahmoud El-
Abed Ahmad'0 5 (hereinafter Atta) was charged under Israeli law
with murder, attempted murder, causing serious bodily injury
with aggravating intent, attempted arson, and conspiracy to
commit a felony. 06 Israel issued an arrest warrant for Atta on
May 3, 1987.107 These charges arose from an attack on an Egged
Bus at the Dir Abu Mishal intersection on the West Bank of
Israel's Occupied Territories which occurred on April 12, 1986.18
On May 9, 1987, the United States issued a warrant to provi-
sionally arrest Atta for his involvement in the attack. 0 9 Later,
Atta was arrested on board a plane bound for the United States
after being expelled from Venezuela on immigration charges."
On June 26, 1987, Israel submitted to the United States a re-
quest for the extradition of Atta pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184
and the 1962 Treaty of Extradition between the United States
102 Id. at 573.
'03 Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 280.
104 Lafferty, supra note 23, at 567.
'' The court noted that the defendant had several names, see In re Atta, (WL
66866 at 51 n.1)(Caden, J.). While the opinion reffered to defendant as Ahmad, he will
be hereinafter referred to as Atta.
10' Id. at 2.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 The warrant was issued under 18 U.S.C. § 3184 which states in part:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the U.S. and any
foreign government, any justice or judge of the U.S. or any magistrate . . . may,
upon complaint . . . charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with hav-
ing committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the
crimes provided for by such treaty . . . issue his warrant for the apprehension of
the person so charged. ...
Id. at 1.
"1 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 42)(Caden, J.).
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and Israel."'
The sworn statements of the two alleged accomplices, " '
Salah Yousef Ahmad Hariz (hereinafter Ahmad Hariz) and
Salah Mohammed Yousef Hariz (hereinafter Mohammed
Hariz)," and a video reenactment of the incident,"' formed the
basis of the facts which the court reviewed.
In early 1986, according to one of Mohammed Hariz's state-
ments, he and Atta met in Puerto Rico.1 5 There, the two men
decided to join the Fatah Abu Nidal organization after the Al-
Fatah organization of Abu Mussa had divided.116 In June of
1985, Mohammed Hariz went to Syria for weapons training at
the suggestion of Atta. Atta, having previous received such mili-
tary training in Syria, went to the West Bank in order to recruit
Palestinians for the Fatah Abu Nidal organization."'
In February 1986, Atta and Mohammed Hariz met again in
Israel after Mohammed Hariz returned from Syria having com-
pleted his weapons training." Atta informed Mohammed Hariz
that they would initiate attacks on Israeli settlers in the area of
"I Convention on Extradition Between The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the State of Israel; 14 U.S.T. 1707, 484 U.N.T.S. 283
(1962) [hereinafter Extradition treaty].
1.. Though these sworn statements were relied upon by the court as the factual ba-
sis of the events, Salah Yousef Ahmad Hariz claimed to have falsely admitted his partici-
pation to protect Ahmad. The court also mentioned that his three statements were con-
tradictory, yet the record was unclear. In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 3)(Caden, J.).
I's Both have been tried and convicted in Israel. Id. at 3.
.. Hariz participated in the video reenactment.
11 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 4)(Caden, J.).
The Fatah Abu Nidal Organization's goal is the destruction of Israel. It carries
out terrorist acts against Israel, western democracies which support that State, and
against rival Arab and Palestinian organizations which support negotiation or accommo-
dation with Israel. L. Bremer III, Terrorism: Myths And Reality (U.S. State Dept., Pub.
Aff. Bureau, Current Policy No. 1047, 1988). The Abu Nidal Organization is believed
responsible for attacks on Jordon in 1983, the Achille Lauro highjacking, the Rome and
Vienna airport massacres of December 27, 1985, and the 1986 murder of 22 worshippers
at an Istanbul synagogue. In 1983, Abu Nidal was expelled from Iraq. In June of 1987,
Syria expelled most of the Abu Nidal Organization. L. Bremer III, Counterterrorism:
U.S. Policy And Proposed Legislation (U.S. State Dept., Pub. Aff. Bureau, Current Pol-
icy No. 1019, 1987). In November of 1988, Abu Nidal appeared at the Palestinian Na-
tional Congress in Algiers, at the time of this writing he is still at large. See, Department
of State Statement on the Declaration by the Secretary of State on the visa application
of Mr. Arafatt, (U.S. State of Dept., Pub. Aff. Bureau, Nov. 28, 1988).
.17 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 5)(Caden, J.).
118 Id.
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Dir Abu Mishal at Ein Zarga. 1" 9 After five failed attempts to at-
tack Israeli settlers and a failed assassination attempt, Atta next
planned an attack on a bus at the Dir Abu Mishal junction.12
Having inspected the location several times, the two men set up
at the junction of Dir Abu Mishal on April 12, 1986, armed with
an Uzi submachine gun and Molotov cocktails.' 1 That night, an
Egged Bus traveling between settlements passed the junction at
approximately 7:30 p.m., en route from Neve Tsuf and heading
towards the village of Aabud.' 22 As the bus crossed the junction,
Mohammed Hariz threw a Molotov cocktail which hit the front
of the bus. Meanwhile, Atta shot at the bus with the Uzi sub-
machine gun as it continued on its route.123 The bus managed to
arrive at Aabud. As a result of the attack, however, one passen-
ger was slightly injured and the driver suffered serious injuries
that later resulted in his death."" After the attack, Atta fled
Israel. Atta's subsequent known journeys led him through many
countries within a two year period, including: Columbia, Cyprus,
Puerto Rico, Mexico, Spain and Venezuela.2 5
Atta was then arrested in Venezuela on immigration charges
and was ordered deported to the United States. " He had been
a naturalized citizen of the United States since 1982. Although
the record was not clear as to what role Israeli and United
States officials had in Atta's arrest and interrogation,' 27 the im-
migration charges were apparently pretextual.2 8 After being in-
' Id. Hariz also stated that he and Atta had previously harassed and threatened
road crews working on the road between the village of Aabud and Dir Abu Mishal.
1" Id. The Dir Abu Mishal junction is located outside the traditional borders of
Israel on the West Bank of Samaria.
1", Id. at 6.
122 Id.
122 Id.
12, Id. at 7.
"' Id. at 59-62 & n.16.
128 Id. at 43. The court noted that the lack of an extradition treaty between Israel
and Venezuela was probably a factor in Venezuela's decision to deport Atta to the U.S.
127 Id. at 42.
128 Atta claimed that he had been under surveillance by U.S. agents prior to his
arrest and that he had been interrogated by U.S., Israeli and Venezuelan authorities.
Documents submitted by the government of Venezuela indicated that Atta was sus-
pected of being a member of the Fatah Abu Nidal terrorist organization and was
processed by counterintelligence. Atta claimed that he had not questioned about the
immigration charges but rather about his activities in Israel, the United States, Mexico,
Puerto Rico and Venezuela. Id.
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terrogated, denied access to an attorney and friends, and having
never been given Miranda warnings, Atta was boarded onto a
plane destined for the United States. 29 Atta was not extradited
to Israel because of the lack of an extradition treaty between
Israel and Venezuela. The record was unclear as to whether he
was arrested while the plane was in international airspace or
upon landing in New York.130 Nevertheless, following Atta's ar-
rest, Israel submitted to the United States a request for his
extradition.'
B. The Decision
The issues before the United States District Court in the
Atta case were: whether Atta was found within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States according to the Article III lim-
itation of the Extradition Treaty' 2 between the United States
and Israel; whether there was sufficient evidence to justify com-
mitting Atta to trial in Israel according to Article V of the Ex-
tradition Treaty; s and whether the Court had to deny the ex-
tradition request because the acts in question were of a political
character according to Article VI (4) of the Treaty. 34 The
129 Id. at 45.
,30 The court could not ascertain whether the arrest occurred while in the plane over
international airspace or after landing in New York. Id.
11
"...the fact that the Israeli arrest warrant for Ahmad dated May 3, 1987, states
that Ahmad was presently in the United States seems to indicate that Israel was aware
of Ahmad's arrest and that Abmad would be brought to the United States soon thereaf-
ter," suggesting Israeli participation. Id. at 44.
132 Convention on Extradition Between The Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the State of Israel; 14 U.S.T. 1707, 484 U.N.T.S. 283
(1962) [hereinafter Extradition treaty], "When the offense has been committed outside
the territorial jurisdiction of the requesting party, extradition need not be granted unless
the laws of the requested party provide for the punishment of such an offense committed
in similar circumstances." Id. at art. 3.
"' Article V states:
Extradition shall be granted only if the evidence be found sufficient, according to
the laws of the place where the person sought shall be found, either to justify his
committal for trial, if the offense of which he is accused had been committed in
that place or to prove that he is the identical person convicted by the courts of the
requesting party.
Id. at art. 5.
13 Article VI, para. 4, states: "Extradition shall not be granted . . . [w]hen the of-
fense is regarded by the requested party as one, of a political character." Id. at art. 6,
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol1/iss1/5
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charges of murder, attempted murder, causing serious bodily in-
jury with aggravating intent, attempted arson, and conspiracy to
commit a felony, brought against Atta by Israel, were all extra-
ditable offenses under Article II, paragraphs 1, 3, and 24 of the
Extradition Treaty.13 5
The Court first determined Israel's Penal Law to be over-
broad in that it granted Israel jurisdiction over offenses commit-
ted outside its territory. 13  According to United States law, this
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction would not be permit-
ted.13 7 However, an Article III determination is not a bar to ex-
tradition. While the treaty states that where the offense has
been committed outside the territory of the requesting State, ex-
tradition need not be granted, the Court foulid that the Treaty
did not prevent the United States from extraditing Atta if it so
desired.13 8
The Court next determined that there was probable cause
to believe that Atta was guilty of the crimes charged and that
the evidence was sufficient to justify Atta's committal to trial.3 9
It then turned its attention to the political offense exception
and Atta's burden of showing that the acts in question were of a
political character and, therefore, outside the scope of the Extra-
dition Treaty." Noting the recent difficulty of other courts in
reconciling the exception with acts of terrorism," the Court
specifically adopted the incidence test defined by the Ninth Cir-
para. 4.
"" Article II of the treaty reads:
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the present Conven-
tion for prosecution when they have been charges with . . . any of the following
offenses: 1. Murder 2. Manslaughter 3. Malicious wrongdoing; inflicting bodily
harm. . . 24. Arson. . . Extradition shall also be granted for participation in any
of the offenses mentioned in this article.
Id. at art. 2.
' In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 8)(Caden, J.).
Under Article IX, the court need only consider United States law. Extradition
treaty, supra, note 132 at art. 9.
" In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 9)(Caden, J.).
"' Id. at 10. The court based its decision of guilt of Ahmad based upon affidavits by
one Israeli police inspector, two Israeli police officers, two passengers on the bus and two
doctors who treated the driver as well as affidavits of Ahmad's accomplices and a video
reenactment of the crime.
40 Id. at 15.
1 Id. at 16.
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cuit Court of Appeals in Quinn v. Robinson."2 Under Quinn, the
act has to be done incident to or in furtherance of a political
uprising in order for the political offense exception to apply. L4 3
However, the Court rejected the Quinn requirement that the act
occur within the territory where the change in government was
sought.144 Even if it was a requirement, the Court reasoned, it
would have been met since Atta's acts occurred on the West
Bank and thus territorial proximity to Israel existed. 4 5 Unlike
the Court in Quinn, the Magistrate did not resolve the issue of
whether the political offense exception applies only to nationals
of the land where the disturbances are occurring. "This court
need not decide whether citizenship or close ties need always ex-
ist for the political offense exception to apply. 14  The Quinn
Court said:
While determining the proper geographic boundaries of an
'uprising' involves a legal isue that ordinarily will be some circum-
stances under which it will be more difficult to do so. We need
not formulate a general rule that will be applicable to all
situations.1 47
Atta was not a national of Israel but a naturalized citizen of the
United States. However, Atta had been born in the region, had
lived most of his life in the area, and had left his wife and chil-
dren there. In light of these factors, the Magistrate held that
Atta's ties to Israel were sufficient to invoke the political offense
exception.
Pursuant to the incidence test, the Court stated that there
were two requirements for the application of the exception.
First, it had to examine whether there was a political uprising,
and then, whether Atta's acts were done incident to or in fur-
therance of a political objective.14 1
12 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 776.
"I Id. at 807.
... In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 16)(Caden, J.).
"' Id. at 16-17.
146 Id. at 19.
... Quinn, 783 F.2d at 807.
"I Id. at 18.
[Vol. 1:163
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C. "The Uprising"
The threshold question addressed by the Court was whether
there existed a political uprising or disturbance. 49 In Eain, the
activity in the Occupied Territories did not pass this scrutiny."'
Such a determination requires a factual analysis of whether an
uprising existed "at the time of" and "at the location of" the
individual's acts. 5' Magistrate Caden made a thorough inquiry
into the historical roots and social realities of the conflict on the
West Bank. The Court chronologically examined the history of
the region 52 starting with the first Jewish settlements in the late
nineteenth century of Palestine. The Court reviewed the histori-
cal immigration of the area, the emergence of the State of Israel,
the hostilities between Palestinians and Israelis, the nationalistic
concerns of each side, the Arab-Palestinian organizations includ-
ing the P.L.O., the involvement by the United Nations, the hos-
tility between Arab States and Israel, and the subsequent wars,
border disputes, occupations, and terrorism. The Court reviewed
the history of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, obtained
from Jordan following the Six Day War of 1967, and also the
Palestinian-Israeli hostilities that have heightened since the oc-
cupation. Magistrate Caden also analyzed the settlement of the
Occupied Territories, the establishment of military governments
and army patrols, the Israeli custom of seizing and condemning
land for public use (such as roads linking Israeli settlements to-
gether), land seizures for military use, and restrictions imposed
on the Palestinian use of their own land. 5 3
The Court concluded that the evidence showed that an up-
rising was occurring on the West Bank when Atta's act took
place.15 4
1" Id. at 20. The incidence test being a two part analysis, if the first requirement of
political uprising cannot be shown there is no logical reason to determine the validity of
the second requirement of whether the act was incident to or in furtherance of the
uprising.
Io Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 519.
In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 20)(Caden, J.).
Id. at 19-40.
"' The court noted that the restrictions were accomplished by military commanders
who could classify the area as a combat zone and close it, restrict the land cultivation
and prohibit building or construction. Id. at 30-31.
154 Among other evidence the court looked at statistics from the Israeli government
which listed 10,871 disturbances of the peace like barricades, Palestinian flag hoisting or
19891
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Where this Court is neither able nor willing to determine
which group, the Israelis or the Palestinians, ought to have the
right to govern the West Bank, it is evident that legitimate argu-
ments exist for both positions. Both the Palestinians and the set-
tlers are capable of fitting the definition of either civilian or sol-
dier, and the West Bank can appropriately be described as
territory upon which a civil war or a violent communal conflict is
occurring. Although there have been, and continue to be, periods
of relative calm, the battle for the right to occupy and govern
continues and was in full force during the period in question.'"
D. "Incidental To"
After finding the existence of an uprising, the Court ad-
dressed the question of whether the acts were done incident to
or in furtherance of a political objective. The Court identified
the objectives of both the Israelis and the Palestinians as their
right to the land as a homeland and to govern, occupy, and own
the land in the Occupied Territories of the West Bank.' 6 Any
action taken against one side's interests and abilities to govern
and occupy, while increasing its own interests and abilities,
would be incidental to the uprising.'5 7 Magistrate Caden found
that the bus routes formed a supply line for the settlements, and
that attacking the busses was a way of impairing the settlers' use
of the roads and cutting off the settlements, thereby strengthen-
ing Palestinian control of the land. 158 Ambassador Fields, who
was an expert witness, testified that the buses, which ordinarily
carry armed settlers traveling between settlements at night,
could be legitimate military targets for an insurgency group try-
ing to displace an occupying force. "
Magistrate Caden found that Atta's acts were incident to
the uprising and in furtherance of the Palestinian objective to
rock throwing between 1977 and 1984 and more than 7,100 cases occurring between mid-
1985 and May 1987. Id. at 33.
"I Id. at 33-34.
156 Id. at 34.
157 Id.
168 The palestinians believed this road was designed to facilitate and encourage set-
tlement by the Israelis. Id. at 69 n.36.
"I Id. at 35-36.
[Vol. 1:163
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gain control over the land."'0
E. The Court's Jurisdiction
The Court found that regardless of the political offense ex-
ception, extradition was barred as it had no jurisdiction over
Ahmad.' 1 Article I of the Treaty of Extradition between the
United States and Israel states that both parties agree to "recip-
rocally ...deliver up persons found . .. in its territory who
have been charged with. . . any offenses mentioned in Article II
• ..or committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the other
or outside thereof ... ."162 Atta argued that he had not been
found in the United States but had been illegally abducted to
the U.S. from Venezuela.163 Magistrate Caden, upon the govern-
ment's unwillingness to provide any discovery concerning the
kidnapping issue, shifted the burden to the government to prove
that Atta was not kidnapped. " Atta did not offer any evidence
as to his alleged kidnapping. The Court reviewed the testimony
of F.B.I. agents involved in the arrest,6 ' and the Israeli partici-
pation 66 , and concluded that Atta had been unlawfully brought
to the U.S. for extradition purposes. 67
Under the Ker-Frisbee doctrine, 6 a even though Atta was
unlawfully arrested by United State's officials, he could still be
extradited if it could be assured that he would receive due pro-
cess of law in the requesting State. In making their political of-
fense exception determination, courts will not inquire into the
judicial system of the requesting State consistent with the neu-
160 Id. at 37.
Id. at 34.
162 Extradition Treaty, supra, note 132 at art. I.
'6' In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 41)(Caden, J.).
16 Id. at 41.
166 Id. at 44. ("It is clear from the testimony of F.B.I. agent... Lyons, that Ahmad
was securely in the custody of U.S. officials while still at the Caracas airport, and long
before his eventual 'arrest' [on supposed immigration charges]").
Id. at 44 ("... the fact that the Israeli arrest warrant for Ahmad dated May 3,
1987 states that Ahmad was 'presently in the United States' seems to indicate that Israel
was aware of Ahmad's arrest and that Ahmad would be brought to the United States
soon thereafter" suggesting Israeli participation).
167 The court found that there was no basis for his arrest according to the govern-
ment's evidence. Id.
16 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbee v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
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trality concept discussed earlier.169 However, such is not the case
when in determining jurisdiction and the applicability of the
Ker-Frisbee doctrine, it became apparent that Atta was ab-
ducted to the United States not to be tried in the United States.
The Court stated that it could not guarantee that Atta would
not be deprived of his U.S. Constitutional rights if tried in
Israel.' Thus, Atta could not be extradited.
Under these circumstances, the Court could not certify the
extradition of a citizen of the United States over whom it had no
jurisdiction .* Moreover, the Magistrate pointed out that an
American citizen's constitutional rights cannot be denied in or-
der to take advantage of foreign policy objectives or treaties.1 71
If the Court allowed this behavior, the Magistrate argued, it
would be breaking its neutrality and taking sides in favor of the
requesting State, as well as encouraging unconstitutional con-
duct by U.S. officials. 173
Part III - Conclusion.
The United States, viewing the political offense exception as
an impediment to combatting international terrorism, has re-
cently tried to eliminate it as part of the Reagan-Bush adminis-
trations' goal of "streamlining" its international legal proce-
dures. "The State Department has worked successfully to
change extradition treaties with Britain, the Federal Republic of
Germany, Belgium, Canada, and Spain. Terrorists should not be
able to escape justice by availing themselves of legal protection
intended for refugees seeking political asylum.' ' 74 The Court in
169 Bassiouni, supra note 26, at 266.
170 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 48)(Caden, J.).
"I Id. at 50-51.
171 Id. at 50 [citing United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir., 1974)]. In
Toscanino, the defendant was kidnapped from South America, transported to the U.S.,
and tortured for seventeen days. The court held this was a violation of due process re-
quiring the court to divest itself of jurisdiction. The court viewed the action of bringing
Ahmad into the U.S. merely for extraditing him as a political move outside the bounds of
the U.S. law. See also, Plaster v. United States, 720 F.2d 340 (4th Cir., 1983), which held
that the U.S. must conform its conduct to the Constitution when carrying out its treaty
obligations; In re Geisser 627 F.2d 745 (5th Cir., 1980, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1031 (1981).
173 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 50)(Caden, J.).
174 Secretary Schultz The Struggle Against Terrorism (U.S. State Dept., Pub. Aff.
Bureau, Current Policy Digest No. 22, Dec. 1986).
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Atta, however, upholds the political offense exception and re-
minds us that the fundamental liberties for which the revolu-
tionaries of the U.S. fought are valid and should apply when re-
viewing offenses committed for political reasons, even if those
political reasons are contrary to U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Atta stands for each individual's fundamental right to seek po-
litical change, which as a last resort includes revolution. The
Atta opinion, while recognizing that there is a limit to the appli-
cations and extensions of the political offense doctrine, also reas-
sures the importance of the judiciary in making that application
through a flexible approach of the incidence test. Courts in the
United States, a nation born from revolutionary uprising and
political dissent, have historically maintained, neutrality in deal-
ing with other States' attempts to punish dissent. The Atta case
highlights the importance of this neutrality.
While the courts have promoted this idea of neutrality, the
Reagan-Bush Administration has acted to counter these efforts.
The Supplementary Treaty between the United States and the
United Kingdom is an indication of the U.S. Government's re-
luctance to uphold the neutrality concept in view of the excep-
tion. The Treaty essentially eradicated the political offense ex-
ception through extreme limitation of its application.
By applying the judicial definition, the Atta case reaffirmed
the notion that a political dissenter is entitled to commit acts in
pursuance of his political beliefs while avoiding the risk of extra-
dition and perhaps persecution. Although the administration has
tried to destroy this neutrality through its three part policy of
dealing with international terrorism (of which the Supplemen-
tary Treaty is a corollary), Atta warns that the government's en-
gagement in operations to abduct suspected terrorists as a way
of carrying out its foreign policy commitments will not be toler-
ated. It is the policy of the United States to "act unilaterally
when [the U.S.] cannot secure cooperation or when circum-
stances make it infeasible to coordinate our actions. ' 175 While,
in this case, the U.S. had the cooperation of Venezuela in ab-
ducting Atta, it is apparent that the U.S. is willing to go to great
lengths in "streamlining" international legal procedures.
" L. Bremer III, Counterterrorism: U.S. Policy And Proposed Legislation (U.S.
State Dept., Pub. Aff. Bureau, Current Policy No. 1019, 1987).
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The Atta case is also important in that it recognizes the ac-
tivity on the West Bank to be a political uprising. While every
extradition hearing is determined by the specific facts of each
case, and this opinion has limited precedential value on any
other extradition determination, Atta marks an important de-
parture from the holding in Eain. This recognition may be the
beginning of a trend in decisions.
While there is no statutory provision allowing the U.S. gov-
ernment to directly appeal from an adverse ruling, the govern-
ment is not without recourse. If a magistrate concludes that an
individual is not extraditable, it is up to the Secretary of State
to decide, under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184, whether to pursue the issue
before another magistrate. In fact, the Secretary of State has ex-
ercised this option in the Atta case. In October of 1988, Justice
Korman of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York became the second trier in the matter to hear
oral argument. At the time of this writing no opinion has yet
been issued. If Justice Korman determines Atta to be nonex-
traditable, the Secretary of State may again seek a ruling from
another magistrate or judge because there is no res judicata ef-
fect in extradition cases.
A question remains whether subsequent adverse rulings, or
even the possibility of such, will have the effect of a renegoti-
ation of the Extradition Treaty with Israel, and to eradicate the
political offense exception, as was done with the United States-
United Kingdom Treaty. This is a real possibility in light of cur-
rent U.S. foreign policy. Ambassador Bremer, Ambassador at
Large for Counter-Terrorism, has stated that: "[m]any of these
• ..treaties contain a so-called political exception clause which
could protect terrorists and other criminals from extradition...
We have been working hard to limit this clause by revising our
extradition treaties. '1 7 The Atta case exemplifies the dynamic
tension between the political offense exception and U.S. foreign
policy objectives.
Meanwhile, Mahmoud Abed Atta has now been incarcerated
for twenty-one months. A decision on his bail application is still
pending.
178 L. Bremer III, Terrorism and the Rule of Law, supra note 12.
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Editor's Note - Shortly before this issue was to be pub-
lished, Judge Korman delivered an opinion in the second extra-
dition hearing. Judge Korman granted the certification for
Atta's extradition. These two diametrically opposed opinions
illustrate the split in authority, the inconsistent application,
and the continuing controversy surrounding the political of-
fense exception.
1. Introduction
In the second decision of In re Extradition of Atta, Judge
Korman, acting as an Article II magistrate, certified the extradi-
tion of the defendant. "7 The doctrines of double jeopardy17 8 and
res judicata17 are inapplicable here. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3184, the
U.S. sought the de novo ruling of another magistrate. The extra-
dition determination of the first magistrate should be given
"only such weight as [a judge] would give to an opinion of a
respected judge in an unrelated case."'' e0 Thus, even though
Judge Korman concluded that Magistrate Caden "applied erro-
neous legal standards and ...his findings of fact are plainly
erroneous, '"'' and the new magistrate's decision to certify the
extradition of the defendant governs, the previous opinion still
warrants consideration. Both opinions demonstrate the conflict-
ing views as to the application of the political offense exception
when dealing with terrorists. Judge Korman's opinion is now
discussed.
2. Facts
Judge Korman briefly recounted the facts and in doing so,
elicited a different set of findings. On April 12, 1986, a Saturday,
an Egged bus was attacked while traveling through "Israeli sub-
urban communities"'182 The bus was attacked by three individu-
"' In re Extradition of Atta, No. 88-CV-2008 (ERK) (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 1989)
(WESTLAW 12227) (Korman, J.).
,78 Collins v. Loisei, 262 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1923).
7' United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 501 (2d Cir., 1986); Matter of Mackin,
668 F.2d 122, 137 n.20 (2d Cir., 1981).
s In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 48 n.2)(Korman, J.), quoting Doherty, 786 F.2d at 501.
,81 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 7)(Korman, J.).
"' Id. at 1. These communities are commonly referred to as "settlements."
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als using one or more Moltov cocktails and an Uzi submachine
gun. The bus was carrying Israeli settlers "who were going to
work to visit friends and family, to the movies, or perhaps even
to synagogue. '183 The driver of the bus was fatally wounded and
one passenger was injured. Two of the Palestinians were ar-
rested, confessed and were tried and convicted, but not before
implicating the defendant.1 84
Judge Korman then focused on the Abu Nidal Organization,
the objectives of that group and whether Atta was a member of
the Organization. 85 While some courts have focused on whether
the defendant was a member of a group, and the group's objec-
tives in determining the application of the exception while rec-
onciling it with terrorism, 86 Judge Korman found that the ob-
jective of the group is the establishment of an independent
Palestinian State through the use of violence. 18 7 He observed
that the Organization opposes any peaceful efforts or diplomatic
settlement to the Arab-Israeli "dispute." In the past, the Organi-
zation has carried out 90 or more terrorist attacks killing ap-
proximately 300 people and wounding around 575. It has not
only targeted Israel and its supporters, but also the United
States, any country incarcerating its members, moderate Arab
governments and even the P.L.O. Currently, Judge Korman con-
tinued, the group is involved in intra-Palestinian politics, but at
the same time raising a militia from the Lebanese refugee camps
and its aim is still the violent establishment of a Palestinian
homeland. 88
As for the defendant's involvement in the Organization,
Judge Korman pointed out that Magistrate Caden had found
probable cause to believe that Atta was an Abu Nidal
terrorist.189
In late April, Venezuela detained Atta due to his suspected
terrorist activity. Venezuela then boarded Atta on a flight to the
183 Id.
184 Id. at 5.
Id. at 2-5.
1 See infra notes 46-47 and text accompanying.
117 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 4)(Korman, J.).
" Id. at 4.
... Id. at 5, citing In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 1O)(Caden, J.)("there is probable cause
to believe the accused is guilty of the crimes charged.").
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U.S. after Magistrate Caden had issued a warrant for his provi-
sional arrest. On June 26, 1987, Israel "formally" requested the
U.S. to extradite the defendant for crimes covered by Article II
of the U.S.-Israeli Extradition Treaty.19 The first extradition
hearing was held before Magistrate Caden who refused to certify
extradition based upon application of the "incidence test" of the
political offense exception, and upon jurisdictional grounds.191
The U.S. Attorney General filed a second extradition com-
plaint pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3184 and was allowed to relitigate
the issues of law and fact at a second extradition hearing.
The law is quite clear on this procedure. Since Magistrate
Caden found the defendant nonextraditable, the United States
government was permitted to pursue the matter before another
magistrate. When a magistrate declines to certify the extradition
of an individual, the "sole recourse" of the U.S. is to file another
complaint before another magistrate "that must be considered
de novo by the new extradition magistrate."'' 92
3. Jurisdiction
Judge Korman first addressed the jurisdictional issue and
determined that the divesture of jurisdiction by Magistrate
Caden was erroneous as a matter of fact. Magistrate Caden de-
termined that because Atta was brought into the U.S. in a "con-
stitutionally impermissible manner" and not "found" in the
U.S., jurisdiction could not be exercised. 19a Judge Korman
pointed out that Caden's conclusion that the U.S. had requested
Venezuala to arrest Atta "for the sole purpose of returning him
for extradition to Israel" was based solely on a presumption
stemming from the U.S. governments unwillingness to litigate
the issue.' At the second extradition hearing, however, the gov-
190 See infra note 106 and accompanying text. Judge Korman did not address
whether an "informal" request had been made any time earlier.
' For a discussion of the Caden opinion see infra text accompanying notes 105-73.
192 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 47-48 & n.2)(Korman, J.) quoting Doherty, 786 F.2d at
491, 501. See also Collins v. Loisei, 262 U.S. 426, 429-30 (1923)("traditional double jeop-
ardy standards are inapplicable to multiple extradition applications"); but compare
Hooker v. Klein, 573 F.2d 1360, 1366 (9th Cir., 1978).
03 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 44)(Caden, J.).
104 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 8)(Korman, J.), quoting In re Atta, (WL 66866 at
44)(Caden, J.).
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ernment presented "credible and compelling evidence" that it
had not made any such request to Venezuala, and in fact, it had
tried "everything possible" to influence Venezuala to deport the
defendant to Israel.' 95 Nor was it responsible for the defendant's
confinement. "This newly presented evidence" Judge Korman
said, "is sufficient to resolve the jurisdictional issue." 9 '
Judge Korman determined then that the divesture of juris-
diction was erroneous as a matter of law. Under the Ker-Frisbee
doctrine,1 97 "the power of a court to try a person is not impaired
by. . .reason of a forcible abduction.. . . Due process of law is
satisfied when one present in court is convicted. . . after having
been fairly appraised of the charges against him and after a fair
trial in accordance with constitutional procedural safegards."''9
Magistrate Caden distinguished this case since Atta was not for-
cibly abducted to stand trial in the U.S., but abducted to be ex-
tradited. 199 "In an extradition proceeding designed to send the
defendant out of the United States, the court cannot assure the
accused will receive due process. ' 20 0 Thus, as the defendant was
brought to the U.S. in a "constitutionally impermissible man-
ner" Magistrate Caden found jurisdiction to be lacking. Judge
Korman, though, noted that the Magistrate never explained how
the U.S. government's actions were "constitutionally impermissi-
ble." 0' 1 Judge Korman could find no basis for determining that
the U.S. request to Venezuala violated due process. The request
did not involve conduct "that shocks the conscience,. . . offends
'a sense of justice,' or runs counter to the 'decencies of civilized
In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 8)(Korman, J.).
I d.
"9 Under the doctrine of mali captus bene detentus, a State which obtains an indi-
vidual through abduction does not lose jurisdiction over that individual. This doctrine
was recognized in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886) and Frisbee v. Collins, 312 U.S. 519
(1952). But See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied,
504 F.2d (380 (2d Cir. 1974)("a court [must] divest itself of jurisdiction over the person
of a defendant where it has been acquired as a result of the government's deliberate,
unnecessary and unreasonable invasion of the accused's constitutional rights."). See in-
fra note 172.
1 8 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 9)(Korman, J.), quoting Frisbee v. Collins, 342 U.S. at
522.
199 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 9)(Korman, J.), citing In re Atta, (WL 66866 at
48)(Caden, J.).
0 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 48)(Caden, J.).
201 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 9-10)(Korman, J.).
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conduct.' '202 Judge Korman seemed to indicate that the request
was indeed permissible, especially since the U.S. government
had probable cause to believe the defendant was a member of a
terrorist organization, that he was guilty and that it believed his
acts were politically unjustifiable."' 8
Judge Korman also indicated that concern for national in-
terest and foreign relations are not factors to be considered. 04
Magistrate Caden expressed concern that if he had exercised ju-
risdiction over the defendant in this case, American citizens ac-
cused of "heinous" crimes by State, may be denied asylum by
other States. 0 5 Judge Korman stated that these concerns, while
read, should not be considered by an extradition magistrate, but
by the Executive branch in its initial decision to grant or deny
extradition. 0 6
Finally, Judge Korman stated that even if defendant's ar-
rest was an unreasonable seizure, the court still could exercise
jurisdiction. Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in Immi-
gration of Naturalization Service v. Lopez-Mandoza 0 7 that
"the mere fact of an illegal arrest has no bearing on a subse-
quent deportation proceeding .,"s Judge Korman deter-
mined that "[this language [was] equally applicable here. ' 20 9
The Political Offense Exception
Judge Korman noted that under Article VI, paragraph 4, of
the Extradition Treaty, extradition shall not be granted "when
the offense is regarded by the requested party as one of a politi-
cal character. 210
To determine what the requested party (in this case the
United States) considers acts of "political character," Judge
Korman agreed that the exception lies within the holdings of
'20 Id. at 10, quoting Rochin v. United States, 342 U.S. 165, 173-72 (1951).
203 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 10)(Korman, J.).
204 Id. at 11.
205 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 50, 52)(Caden, J.).
2" In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 11)(Korman, J.)("These considerations . ..are not
matters properly within the concern of an extradition magistrate.").
207 168 U.S. 1034 (1984).
208 Id. at 1039-40.
209 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 13)(Korman, J.).
210 Extradition Treaty, supra note 132.
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Quinn v. Robinson,2 1' Eain v. Wilkes,1 2 Matter of Mackin,1 3
and Matter of Doherty.214 However, he did not accept the "inci-
dence test" found within these cases as the proper standard, but
instead stated: "While these cases reflect continuing debate over
the precise scope of the political act exception, the results
reached in a line of cases . . . support the principle that 'the
United States does not regard the indiscriminate use of violence
against civilians as a political offense.' ",15 Judge Korman stated:
"According to . . . Magistrate [Caden], any act, regardless of
how 'heinous' or at whom it is directed, is a political act within
the exception . . ., provided that the motive for it is 'purely po-
litical' and the act was incidental to a violent political uprising,
civil war or rebellion. 216
Judge Korman then examined the Quinn decision. The
Judge was troubled to find that under Quinn the U.S. would
have to grant safe harbor to an individual whose acts were done
for purely political reasons of a change in government within an
area where the individual resides or has ties to and where a civil
war or uprising is occurring.217
Judge Korman proclaimed the Quinn analysis to be
flawed.21 8 He dismissed Quinn's holding that tactics used are ir-
relevant to the application of the exception as "sweeping rheto-
ric. ' 219 While Quinn stated that it is not "our place to impose
our notions of civilized strife on people," Judge Korman stated
that "it is plainly our place to decide who may obtain safe har-
bor in, or passage through, the United States. 22 This "safe har-
bor" argument was addressed in Eain v. Wilkes221 which Judge
Korman used to justify dismissal of the Quinn decision.
21 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
.12 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 451 U.S. 884 (1981).
213 558 F.2d 122 (2d Cir., 1981).
214 599 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
'" In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 14)(Korman, J.), quoting In re Extradition of
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 570 (N.D. Ohio 1985).
"' In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 14)(Korman, J.).
217 Id. at 15-16.
211 Id. at 17.
219 Id.
s Id. at 17.
2' 641 F.2d at 520 ("We recognize the validity and usefulness of the political offense
exception, but it should be applied with great care lest our country become a social jun-
gle and an encouragement to terrorists everywhere.").
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Judge Korman also found flaw in the Quinn neutrality doc-
trine. While the political character of an act is determined by
the law of the requested party, he said, "it is difficult to under-
stand why that determination should be made in a moral vac-
uum without reference to 'our own notions of civilized
strife.' "22 The neutrality doctrine's goal is that "today's rebels
may be tomorrow's rulers" and that a decision granting extradi-
tion may be viewed as favoring one side over the other. Yet,
Judge Korman pointed out that the U.S. State Department had
already considered this foreign policy matter. A State Depart-
ment official testified that "extradition is one of the United
States' most important law enforcement tools in terrorist mat-
ters . . . to ensure that the United States does not become a
haven for violent criminals . . . and that the United States be-
comes viewed as a reliable partner in the fight against terror-
ist.' '22 ' According to Judge Korman, future impact on foreign re-
lations should be left to the Executive branch.
4. The Test: Rules of Engagement
In rejecting the view of Quinn that any act, no matter how
"heinous," may be a political act if politically motivated, Judge
Korman announced that the opinion in Matter of Doherty224
contained the proper analysis.
Not every act committed for a political purpose or during a
political disturbance may or should properly be regarded as a po-
litical offense. Surely the atrocities at Dachau, Aushwitz, and
other death camps would be arguable political within the meaning
of that definition. The same would be true of My Lai, the Bataan
death march, Lidice, the Katyn Forest Massacre, and a whole
host of violations of international law that the civilized world is,
has been, and should be unwilling to accept.
Surely an act which would be properly punishable even in the
context of a declared war or in the heat of open military conflict
cannot and should not receive recognition under the political ex-
222 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 19)(Korman, J.), quoting Quinn, 783 F.2d at 804-05.
223 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 20)(Korman, J.).
224 599 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
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ception to the Treaty.225
Judge Korman announced this to be the analysis to be used;
"'[Ain act which would be properly punishable even in the con-
text of a declared war or in the heat of open military conflict'
cannot be considered a political offense. ' 226 This, Judge Korman
said "provides a 'neutral' standard derived form rules governing
the conduct of military personnel engaged in military con-
flict. ' 221 These rules reflect international legal standards promul-
gated and accepted by the Executive and Legislative branches of
the U.S. government. While defendant argued that this rule was
too inflexible and did not allow terror to be used as a tactic.
Judge Korman answered that such an appeal should be ad-
dressed to the Executive branch, who is politically accountable
and able to make those non-legal judgments.
Under this new analysis, the issue then became "whether
[the defendant's] act was a legitimate act of war or a punishable
act" which "depended on whether the act was against military
personnel . . . or against civilians ... ,22 Judge Korman con-
sidered whether the victims on the Egged bus were military per-
sonnel or civilians and whether the bus was a military target or a
civilian object under the rules of engagement. He noted that "it
was [inlappropriate under the rules of engagement to firebomb
the Egged bus for the purpose of killing every passenger. "122
Under the rules of engagement, some burden lies with the sol-
dier; that is, an object is presumed civilian until proven
otherwise.230
As for the Egged bus, Judge Korman found through expert
testimony that the bus did not serve a "primarily" military func-
tion, that the bus routes and roads were not developed "primar-
ily" for Israeli military operations, and therefore the bus could
not be considered anything other than a civilian object that was
"occasionally" used in military operations.2 3 1 Since the bus was
not being used as a military vehicle at the time of the attack, it
*15 Id. at 274.
126 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 22)(Korman, J.).
327 Id.
228 Id. at 23.
220 Id. at 33.
230 Id. at 23. This conclusion was drawn from the expert testimony presented.
'31 Id. at 24-25.
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was not a legitimate military target.
As for the settlers, Judge Korman did not find them to be
legitimate military targets, as a matter of fact, when applying
the rules of engagement. The facts did not establish that all set-
tlers were a functional part of the military, that all carried weap-
ons and that all were involved in attacking Palestinians.23
While Magistrate Caden stated that the settlers "do not fit
the description of military personnel as it is commonly thought
of. . . . [Alt a minimum they are willing participants in a civil
war or violent community conflict designed to acquire a lang
sought after homeland."'233 Judge Korman instead argued:
"stated in the light most favorable to the defendant, the most
that can be said is that the defendant. . . attempted to murder
every passenger on a civilian vehicle simply because one or more
of the passengers could be described as arguably non-civil-
ian.' ,,234 This, he said, violated the rules of engagement. Further
the presented statistics supported that "there was no civil war or
violent community conflict raging on the West bank in April of
1986 of sufficient magnitude to transform every Palestinian and
Israeli . . . into a combatant .... "'35
Finally, Judge Korman stated:
The question whether the murder of individuals, who are not en-
gaging in combat or who are not members of the military, is a
political act because of the perception or the perpetrator, or the
validity of the perception, that the victims lack political legiti-
macy, is one that cannot be answered by extradition magistrates
or judges.236
5. Conclusion
Judge Korman stated that the Doherty case provided a
"neutral standard" to determine the political character of the
act: "'an act which would be properly punishable even in the
context of a declared war or in the heat of open military conflict'
:32 Id. at 33.
33 In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 34)(Caden, J.).
:34 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 34)(Korman, J.).
11 Id. at 34-35.
'16 Id. at 41.
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cannot be considered a political offense. '237 This, however, was
not the Doherty test. Judge Sprizzo in that case stated:
The Court concludes. . . that no act be regarded as political
where the nature of the act is such as to be violative of interna-
tional law, and inconsistent with international standards of civi-
lized conduct.
Surely an act which would be properly punishable even in the
context of a declared war or in the heat of open military conflict
cannot and should not receive recognition under the political ex-
ception to the Treaty.2"
What Judge Korman thought to be the Doherty standard
was a qualification of the real standard; "violative of interna-
tional law, and inconsistent with international standards of civi-
lized conduct. 23 9
The problem with basing a test upon rules of engagement is
that it presumes there to be such rules. Such an approach is in-
consistent with the realities of modern warfare. Even the Do-
herty Court recognized that "the political offense exception is
not limited to .. .more traditional and overt military hostili-
ties. The lessons of recent history demonstrate that political
struggles have been commenced and effectively carried out by
armed guerrillas . 240
Another problem with such a standard is that the historic
roots of the exception deal with revolutionary activity and not
with war.241 The terms rebellion, revolution, uprising, civil war,
insurrection do not mean war. The Quinn Court recognized the
distinction:
"... courts do not appear to have applied the incidence test to
offenses engaged in during the course of military conflicts be-
tween nations. Rather, they have followed the Castioni formula-
tion that the offense must be related to 'a political rising,' . - . or
the Ezeta formulation that it must be related to a 'civil war, in-
surrection, or political commotion.' "242
237 Id. at 22; see infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
" Doherty, 599 F.Supp. at 274.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 275.
2,1 See In re Ezta, 62 F. 972, 998 (N.D. Cal. 1894); In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. at
156 (1890); see also infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
12 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 808 n.33, quoting Casioni, 1 Q.B. at 165, Ezeta, 62 F. at 998.
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Judge Korman found the evidence insufficient to call the West
Bank situation an "uprising," let alone a war.24
Further, is it consistent to hold the Palestinians accountable
under the rules of engagement of the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols when even Judge Korman found them to be non-com-
batants? Judge Korman said: "there was no 'civil war or violent
community conflict' raging on the West Bank in April of 1986 of
sufficient magnitude to transform every Palestinian and Israeli
into a combatant 'capable of fitting the definition of . . . sol-
dier".2 4" According to Judge Korman's opinion one side to this
"dispute" was found to be of "innocent civilian" nature, while,
in applying the same analysis, he held the other side to the stan-
dard of being a soldier.
In support of the "rules of engagement" analysis, Judge
Korman cited Doherty's examples of the Nazi atrocities at
Dachau, Aushwitz and the other death camps. Other examples
of atrocities cited in Doherty were extracted and included in the
opinion. These are not proper analogies to the defendant's act in
this case. Similarly, the Demjanjuk case, a case involving alleged
"war crimes" and "crimes against humanity," was cited for sup-
port, despite its application of the "incidence test" under this
same treaty,2 ' and its reluctance to adopt the rule in Doherty.""
All of these examples, as well as Judge Korman's characteriza-
tions to the defendant's acts as "heinous," illustrate that he did
not view the defendant's acts "in a moral vacuum," and his deci-
sion may reflect his own moral conclusions of terrorism.
In applying the "rules of engagement" analysis there arises
other questions. Under international law, States can consider
"war crimes" to be within the political offense exception."" Fur-
ther, under the true Doherty analysis, "crimes against human-
ity," such as genocide, do violate international law."4" But
"I' In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 22)(Korman, J.).
24 Id. at 34, quoting In re Atta, (WL 66866 at 30).
245 In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 570.
241 Id. at 570-71 ("The Court need not address at this time whether the political
offense exception in United States extradition treatise are to be interpreted as broadly as
the Doherty court construes the exception.").
241 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 799.
249 See Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, T.I.A.S. No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; The Nurnberg (Nuremberg)
Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (Int'l Military Tribunal 1946); United States v. Artukovic, 355 U.S.
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neither the Eain or Quinn Courts characterized the P.L.O.'s ac-
tivities as such crimes.2"e While there has been legislative at-
tempts to reject the use of terrorism, its legality under interna-
tional law is still debatable.25 And while there was probable
cause to believe that Atta had committed the acts specified in
the Israeli indictment, 51 there was no evidence presented as to
probable cause to believe that a "war crime" or "crime against
humanity" had occurred. War crimes are "devastations not justi-
fied by military necessity."2"' No evidence was presented for any
such conclusion.
Another problem with Judge Korman's opinion deals with
the issue and use of the neutrality doctrine and the deference
given to the Executive branch. While "today's rebels may be to-
morrow's leaders," Korman said, the effect of any such appear-
ance of sponsorship through certification would be made by the
Executive branch. In this case, Judge Korman noted that the
State Department had weighed the effects of this extradition on
foreign policy. The government testified that extradition is one
of the U.S.'s "most important law enforcement tools in terrorist
matters," and that it should be granted in this case to ensure
that the U.S. doesn't become a haven for terrorist and be seen as
"a reliable partner in the fight against terrorism."253
In Matter of Doherty Judge Sprizzo wrote:
The Court is not persuaded by the fact that the current po-
litical administration in the United States had strongly de-
nounced terrorist acts and has stated that to refuse extradition in
393 (1958).
249 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 802 n.28.
250 See U.N. Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts
of International Terrorism: United States Working Paper, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.850 (Sept.
25, 1972), reprinted in 1 R. Friedlander, Terrorism: Documents of International and Lo-
cal Control 487 (1979); 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism §201, Pub.L. 98-533,
96 Stat. 2706, 2707 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3077); European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism art. 1, done Jan. 27, 1977, reprinted in Control of Terrorism:
International Documents 87 (Alexander 1979); Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions art.
51, adopted June 8, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 annex I, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1431-
32 (1977). But see, G.A. Res. 3103, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/
9030 (1974) (armed struggles for independence and self-determination are in "full accor-
dance with the principles of international law.").
251 See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
22 The Nurnberg (Nuremberg) Trial, 6 F.R.D. at 130.
223 In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 20)(Korman, J.).
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this case might jeopardize foreign relations . . .The Treaty vest
the determination of the limits of the political offense exception
in the courts and therefore reflects a congressional judgment that
the decision not be made on the basis of what may be the current
view of any one political administration." 4
Certainly, Judge Sprizzo realized that the Executive branch
is not capable of being neutral since it is the one seeking extra-
dition. As the government must also determine foreign relations
considerations, neutrality is the role of the extradition
magistrate.
In supporting the application of the broad rule in Doherty,
Judge Korman stated that if the rules of engagement proved too
inflexible in considering the use of terror as a revolutionary tac-
tic, "the remedy lies in appeal to the Executive Branch, which is
politically accountable for its determinations . . . ." Judge
Sprizzo in Doherty wrote, however, that the opinion of the pop-
ulace is not dispositive to the issue.
• . .at the time of the American Revolution, there were a large
number of colonists who not only desired a continued union with
England, but regarded the thought of armed opposition to the
Crown as both treasonous and abhorrent. . . . Given the nature
of that history it would indeed be anomalous for an American
court to conclude that the absence of a political consensus for
armed resistance in itself deprives such resistance of its political
character.155
Likewise, an American court should not allow political consensus
to be the appeal of an inflexible test. This also assumes that the
Executive branch would not have already considered any politi-
cal consequence in its initial decision to extradite a defendant.
Nor is it likely, when dealing with terrorism, that any such grass
roots movement would swell sufficient enough, if at all, to out-
weigh the Government's strong foreign policy goals, and trigger a
change in the government's decision.
Further, it is not clear from Judge Korman's opinion how
"the results reached in a line of cases" while supporting the
principle that "the United States does not regard the indiscrimi-
" Doherty, 599 F. Supp. at 277 n.6. See also In re Mackin, 688 F.2d 122, 132-37;
Eain, 641 F.2d at 513.
" Doherty, 599 F. Supp at 273 n.2.
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nate use of violence against civilians as a political offense, '"250
apply in any analysis. While the results reached depend on the
facts of each case, it is not the results which are useful for our
purposes, but the principles of law which applied in those cases.
Judge Korman relied on the Demjanjuk as a source for the
principle. However, that principle was not fully explained. Both
Demjanjuk and Eain exclude violent acts against innocent civil-
ians from the political offense exception. But as the Quinn
Court pointed out: "The distinction between 'innocent' and
'guilty' civilians may not be as simple as it may first appear and
it is not always an ideologically neutral distinction. ' 257 Even
Judge Korman's lengthy inquiry into the civilian or combatant
status of the Israeli settlers indicates that their innocence is not
as clear as the victims of the Nazi death camps.
And while Judge Korman would agree with the result
reached in Demjanjuk, he cited the case despite that the Court
had applied the "incidence test. 258 The Demjanjuk Court also
declined to adopt the Doherty standard: "The Court need not
address at this time whether political offense exceptions in
United States extradition treatise are to be interpreted as
broadly as the Doherty court construes the exception. 2 59
On a final note, while the result of this case is of no sur-
prise, given the government's ability to relitigate the issue until
obtained, the application of law is. From Judge Korman's opin-
ion it is not clear how Magistrate Caden "applied erroneous le-
gal standards," for debate continues as to which legal standards
apply in these cases. Whether the "incidence test" or the Do-
herty analysis apply will be decided by Judge Weinstein of the
In re Atta, (WL 12227 at 14)(Korman, J.), citing Demjanjuk, 612 F.Supp at 520;
Eain 641 F.2d at 521 (emphasis added).
157 Quinn, 783 F.2d at 802 n.29.
28 In re Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp at 570 ("For an act to fall within the political
offense exception to the Treaty, the Court must determine that there was a violent polit-
ical disturbance, such as war, revolution or rebellion, at the time and place of the alleged
act and that the acts charged were recognizably incidental to the disturbance.").
25 Id. at 570-71.
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Eastern District of New York. Shortly after the Korman deci-
sion Atta filed a writ of habeas corpus.
In the meantime, Atta has now been incarcerated for two
years.
Lorenzo L. Lorenzotti
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